This study examines the usefulness of financial statement information in evaluating very small newly listed high-technology nano cap firms' (i.e., market capitalization less than USD 50 million) by employing data from 36 countries during the high investor sentiment era of 1995-2000. I find that financial statement information is useful in screening nano caps from non-nano caps as well as explaining nano caps' delisting risk and valuing them. The evidence based on these three approaches is consistent with the view that financial statements provide useful information to investors for evaluating high financial risk, hard-to-value firms irrespective of the institutional setting during a high investor sentiment period.
Introduction
In this study I examine whether financial statements provide useful information for evaluating future prospects of very small newly listed high-technology firms during a high investor sentiment period. Financial statements provide an important publicly available source of information for investors in their assessment of a firm's future prospects. However, their usefulness in the case of young high-technology firms especially during high investor sentiment periods, or "market bubbles," is ambiguous. The accounting system is shown to poorly capture the economics of such firms (e.g., Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Core et al., 2003) . Nevertheless, Penman (2003) argues that financial reporting should ideally serve as an anchor during market bubbles and suppress speculative tendencies.
Small newly listed high-technology firms represent a special challenge to investors and market regulators. For example, investors and analysts consider firms with low market capitalization to be highly speculative and risky in general (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Lui et al. 2007) . Especially, firms with low market capitalization, newly listed and operating in the high-technology industry are likely to exhibit "high financial risk" (e.g., Duff and Phelps, 2008) . In fact, the low market capitalization suggests that investors perceive nano caps to have only modest future potential to generate a substantial amount of future cash flows.
Similarly, the world's most prominent market regulator, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S., considers small firms to be risky investments for investors due to the quality of firms, public information available, liquidity and susceptibility to fraud (e.g., U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004; see also Lui et al., 2007) . Especially risky are considered to be so-called nano cap firms that have market capitalization less than USD 50 million. 1 Nevertheless, one should note that nano caps have been accepted for public trading, and hence they have passed the criteria imposed in listing standards.
1 For example, the SEC revised the Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 in 2005 and imposed minimum requirements for newly listed firms to have a positive net income, a market value of listed securities of USD 50 million and a minimum bid price of USD 4 per share. For various definitions of firm size classes used by market participants, see for example www.investordictionary.com, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/, and http://www.investopedia.com/. Nano caps are sometimes interchangeably called penny stocks, micro caps or small caps. However, the important distinction is that penny stock is sometimes defined based only on the maximum stock price level (e.g., less than USD 5.00) regardless of the total market capitalization. Hence, penny stocks are at least partly determined by the number of shares outstanding. Nano caps are, in turn, defined solely based on the total market capitalization.
On the other hand, young emerging high-technology firms are considered to be important for economic growth (see Levine, 1997 Levine, , 2005 . As a response to growing demand by investors seeking riskier but higher yielding investments, as well as riskier firms with undeveloped business models and uncertain future cash flows seeking funding for their growth opportunities, several stock exchanges have developed new, so-called junior or parallel marketplaces that aim to facilitate such firms' access to public equity financing. 2 The potential role of financial statement information in facilitating efficient capital allocation among such risky firms is pronounced due to high uncertainty and undeveloped information environment.
Motivated by the importance of and challenges presented by newly listed hightechnology firms with very low market capitalization, I examine the relevance of financial statement information, or firm fundamentals measured with accounting data, of newly listed high-technology nano caps from all over the world during a high investor sentiment period of 1995-2000. I employ data on newly listed firms as they provide an interesting context in which to examine very small firms, as the initiation of public trading is the first time a firm is exposed to public market scrutiny and the resulting market valuation reflects investors' assessment of their future prospects and ability to generate free cash flows. 3 Moreover, the investors' irrational behavior and ignorance of firm fundamentals ('fundamentals don't matter') is argued to be prevalent for speculative firms during high investor sentiment periods (e.g., Malkiel, 1999; Baker and Wurgler, 2006) . I employ international sample of firms to enhance the power of the statistical tests and to provide more generalizable evidence as the closely related existing evidence is based on the U.S. data (see Section 2.). -world-exchanges.org. 3 While the hurdle of market capitalization of USD 50 million may seem as an arbitrary cut-off, it has roots in the regulatory and investment practices motivating the upper limit for firm size as discussed above. Nevertheless, such numeric thresholds should be considered suggestive about firm size in relative terms especially across countries as well as to represent heuristic rules of thumb potentially employed by investors and regulators. An alternative method to define very small firms would be to use the sample distribution of market values. However, such definition may lack any intuitive foundation potentially used by investors and regulators.
categorizing, or screening, newly listed high-technology nano caps by their market capitalization in the global sample. Categorizing investment targets is argued to be an important mechanism that investors use to cope with uncertainty in their investment decisions (see Daniel et al. 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Chan et al. 2004; Hirshleifer et al. 2004) . Second, I examine how firm fundamentals explain nano caps' tendency to exit after their initial listing year (i.e., delisting risk). Delisting represents an ultimate failure of a listed firm as a stand alone listed company and can be a high cost event to investors (e.g., Shumway, 1997 ; see also Demers and Joos, 2007) .
Finally, I examine how firm fundamentals explain the differences in relative valuation among the nano cap firms. Use of financial statement information in firm valuation is one of its primary purpose of use and it is a widely employed approach in accounting research (see Kothari, 2001 The descriptive evidence in this study reveals that nano caps are common among newly listed high-technology, comprising roughly 40% of my large sample of 3,915 firms even during a period of high investor sentiment. This is striking as newly listed high-technology firms are commonly asserted to exhibit extreme growth opportunities and excessive valuations (e.g., Pastor and Veronesi, 2003; Baker and Wurgler, 2006) . Most of the 1,543 nano caps (82.9%) in my sample are located in strong investor protection countries that facilitate relatively better public external financing for new business ventures, but also relatively higher valuation of firms in general (e.g., Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; La Porta et al., 2002) . Moreover, the emergence of nano caps is concentrated (roughly 79%) in the so-called Internet bubble years of 1998-2000, potentially reflecting low quality new listings during that period (e.g., Fama and French, 2004) .
My screening analysis on firm fundamentals based on multivariate logistic regression model shows that firm fundamentals separate nano caps from non-nano caps. In particular, nano cap firms are more likely to have firm fundamentals that are associated with less mature business models, less investment activity to create both tangible and intangible future cash-generating assets, and more limited liquid resources to support future investments, and hence to exploit growth opportunities, than their non-nano cap counterparts.
Moreover, I document based on my risk assessment analysis using logistic regression method that firm fundamentals are significant determinates of nano caps' tendency to delist. That is, the evidence shows that firms that exit under poor financial conditions invest more in intangible assets and are financially weaker. There is also some evidence that more mature firms are more likely to exit. Furthermore, the speed of the exit after the initial listing year is higher for firms with more mature business models, higher investment activity and weaker financial positions based on the Cox proportional hazard model that accounts for the potential bias introduced by data being right-hand censored.
Finally, the evidence from my relative valuation analysis using multivariate ordinary least squares regression technique indicates that firms with less mature business models but relatively higher investment activity in tangible assets and operating and organizational intangible assets (but not in R&D) and weaker financial positions are valued relatively higher among the nano cap firms. The evidence also is consistent with prior research on the unconventional valuation of high-technology firms during the new economy era.
Overall, the evidence in this study indicates that the accounting-based firm fundamentals measuring the maturity of a small newly listed business venture, the intensity of activity to create Demers and Lev, 2001; Bartov et al., 2002; Hand, 2003 Hand, , 2005 Armstrong et al., 2006; Aggrawal et al., 2007) and assessing the delisting risks of newly listed high technology firms (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Demers and Joos, 2007) showing that financial statement information is important for evaluating such high financial risk firms regardless of the institutional setting. Finally, my study uses three complementary approaches to examine and to validate the results on the usefulness of financial statement information, while the extant research typically employs only one of the approaches employed in this study.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature on the association between firm fundamentals and delisting and valuation and makes testable predictions. Section 3 discusses the sample. Section 4 presents the analysis and results. Section 5 concludes.
Relevant literature and predictions
In this section, I focus on studies that examine the relationships between firm fundamentals, performance and market valuation with emphasis on small firms and hightechnology firms. In general, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) argue that young firms are likely to exhibit greater uncertainty about their future profitability. Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that newer (younger, newly listed), smaller, more volatile in terms of stock returns, unprofitable, nondividend paying, distressed or with extreme growth potential (i.e., less stable firms) firms are highly sensitive to market sentiments. Lui et al. (2007) conjecture that analysts consider riskier 5 While most of the nano caps in my sample are from strong legal investor protection countries (e.g., the English Law system), the country-specific factors associated with the legal protection of investors as suggested in the law and finance literature (see La Porta et al., 2000) add only marginally to the explanatory power of my empirical models.
firms to have high leverage, low market-to-book and low market capitalization. Smaller firms also earn on average higher returns than larger firms due to their higher riskiness (Banz, 1981;  see also Ibbotson, 2005) .
Moreover, the information environment is likely to be more challenging for investors in the case of newly listed smaller firms. Grinblatt and Titman (2002) argue that informational problems are the highest among new lists for which there is potentially little proven track record, historical information and comparative firms. The listing process in general is documented to be informationally inefficient, and not all public information is fully incorporated into the offer pricing range (Lowry and Schwert, 2004) . The information environment is also poorer for smaller firms than for larger firms (e.g., Atiase, 1985) .
Low valuation and firm performance
While valuation theory in general asserts that firms with relatively higher profitability and growth and/or lower risk are valued at a higher level, prior studies have not examined the determinants of nano caps or penny stocks relative to higher valued firms. However, the research on so-called penny stock IPOs (stock price less than USD 5.00) indicates that such firms are riskier in general. For example, Bradley et al. (2005) find that U.S. penny stock IPOs are more severely underpriced than other IPOs (that is, they have higher initial returns) and perform even worse than other IPOs in the long-run. Seguin and Smoller (1997) document that U.S. penny stocks are less likely to survive as listed firms and thus exhibit relatively higher exit or "mortality" rates. In contrast to expectations, they find no evidence that mortality is associated with market capitalization. Carpentier and Suret (2007) find that for Canadian penny stock IPOs, only firm size (equity over CAD 25 million) and industry are significantly associated with firm success, measured as graduation to a higher level exchange from a junior market, while profitability among other firm characteristics are not. Finally, a related study on small business IPOs in Young and Zaima (1988) finds that younger firms (a measure of risk) perform relatively more poorly than older firms after the listing of their stock.
Survival of newly listed firms
In general, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the long-term viability of newly listed technology firms (Jain et al., 2008) . The evidence from small firms indicates that a strong financial position is an essential protection against financial distress for small businesses in general (see Mudambi and Treichel, 2005) . In fact, Welsh and White (1981) argue that liquidity is even more important than profitability. Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) , in turn, document that a higher financial leverage (debt-to-equity) ratio and a lower profitability (ROA) are associated with corporate failures. Similarly, Mudambi and Treichel (2005) find that the probability that newly listed Internet ventures run into cash crises is increasing in a weaker financial position, measured by debt to total assets and equity and firm size to total assets, among other criteria.
However, the evidence on newly listed, young, high-technology firms also emphasizes investments in future assets as a key to survival. Jain and Kini (1999) find that while firms that go public early in their growth cycle (e.g., unprofitable firms) are more likely to risk failure, the firms in high R&D intensity industries are more likely to survive.
The evidence from newly listed high-technology firms suggests that the delisting risk is associated with firm fundamentals. In particular, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) and Demers and Joos (2007) examine the delisting risk for newly listed internet firms and high-technology (excluding internet) firms, respectively. 6 In particular, smaller firms (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Demers and Joos, 2007) , firms with lower profitability (Demers and Joos, 2007) , firms with higher leverage (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Demers and Joos, 2007) and firms with lower R&D (Demers and Joos, 2007) are more likely to delist. In addition to firm fundamentals, other factors are associated with survival. Jain et al. (2008) find that the probability of the future profitability of newly listed technology firms decreases with pre-IPO investor demand and changes with the top management team, but increases with venture capital participation, the proportion of outsiders on the board, and pre-market valuation uncertainty. On the other hand, a higher delisting risk is associated with a lower stock price (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Demers and Joos, 2007 ) and a shorter firm age (Demers and Joos, 2007) . 
Valuation of high-technology firms
The valuation theory demonstrates that a firm's value is a function of its expected profitability, growth and risk. In particular, value increases in profitability and growth but 6 In general, the reasons for involuntary delisting by exchange or market regulators are due to (i) violations of listing rules related to market performance such as minimum market value and trading volume and (ii) adverse or poor operating performance-related insolvency or bankruptcy (e.g., Macey et al., 2005) . 7 Duff and Phelps (2008) suggest that small caps consists of a disproportionate number of high-technology firms, start-ups, and recent IPOs, which are inherently riskier than firms with a track record of viable performance.
decreases in riskiness of a business venture. However, the extant evidence provides mixed and perhaps seemingly contradicting evidence to the conventional valuation theory on the association between firm fundamentals and the value of newly listed high-technology firms.
Fundamental determinates of valuation multiples for high-technology firms
The evidence from valuation multiples of high-technology firms in Bhojraj and Lee (2002) shows that, in addition to average industry valuation multiples, operating profit margin, are positively associated with market value ('value enhancing'), while cost is negatively associated with market value ('value diminishing'). However, for pre-IPO costs, sales, marketing, general and administrative expenses are all value enhancing. They argue that the evidence is consistent with venture-backed firms having a strong "investment aspect," as the companies build a platform/infrastructure to growth and validate their business model(s).
Moreover, Armstrong et al. (2006) suggest that cash is the single most important balance sheet asset for early-stage, venture-backed companies.
Valuation of Internet IPOs
Several studies have examined the valuation of Internet firms during the new economy era (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . In general, the evidence in these studies is mixed regarding the association between firm fundamentals and value. In particular, Trueman et al. (2000) find no significant association between net income and market prices. They find that the evidence is consistent with the claim that financial statement information has limited usefulness for the valuation of Internet firms. However, the decomposition of net income into its components shows that gross profits are positively associated with value. Bartov et al. (2002) find that cash flows, sales, and sales growth are significantly related to offer prices, while earnings, book value of equity, and R&D
are not significantly associated with the IPO offer price. They argue that the valuation of Internet firms departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments.
Moreover, Hand (2003) documents that IPO valuation is linearly and positively associated with book value of equity but negatively and concavely related to income before nonrecurring items. However, Hand (2003) (2003) and Demers and Lev (2001) find that R&D and marketing expenses are positively associated with value, consistent with the idea that such expenses are implicitly capitalized by investors to create intangible assets. Finally, Demers and Lev (2001) find that cash burn is a significant valuation driver. This finding is consistent with the positive valuation of various expenses and negative earnings, suggesting that the current period's reported expenses are considered value-enhancing investments in the future.
Empirical predictions
Based on the prior literature, I make the following predictions regarding the relationship between the newly listed nano caps' fundamentals, their exit from public trading and valuation. Moreover, investment activity in creating future intangible assets, as reflected by higher R&D expenses, negative operating profitability and operating cash flows, as well as future tangible assets, as reflected by larger capital expenditures, is valued at a higher level. Also, a low or no dividends paid reflects that a firm invests its potential profits back into its future operations. Finally, the above evidence also suggests that an important determinant of a firm's financial strength for young innovative firms is liquid resources. However, the level of financial leverage, and especially a relatively higher level of debt financing, is also considered to reduce a firm's financial strength and flexibility, while no debt indicates that a firm has high debt capacity. Conventionally interpreted, a negative book value of equity reflects that a firm is in financial distress (e.g., Dichev, 1999) .
Second, which nano caps are likely to exit from public trading? Essentially the predictions are the same as for the factors that separate nano caps from non-nano caps. I predict that nano caps that are more likely to exit relative to the other nano caps have relatively less mature business models, less activity in creating future tangible and intangible assets, as well as lower financial strength. The motivation for these predictions is the same as above.
Finally, I predict that nano caps that have higher relative valuation among the nano caps have, based on the evidence on the unconventional valuation of high-technology firms during the new economy period of 1995-2000 discussed in previous section, less mature business models, more activity in creating future tangible and intangible assets, as well as greater financial resources (see also Pastor and Veronesi 2003) . In other words, I expect that the fundamental laws of valuation are not applicable to nano caps in general in terms of firm maturity especially regarding firm size and profitability measures.
In sum, the above predictions suggest that financial statement data reflecting maturity of a firm's business model, firm's investment activity and its financial strength should provide useful information for evaluating newly listed high-technology nano caps. Given the substantial differences even in the information regarding the initial listing year in these two databases, I include only firms for which the year of the initial recording of the market capitalization data at the end of the reporting year in Worldscope is the same or earlier than the year of the initial market price data in Datastream. This procedure aims to ensure that there is reasonable certainty that the correct year is selected as a firm's initial listing year and also that there is data on firm fundamentals available in Worldscope.
Sample
Finally, I eliminate firms that have re-entries to listing (i.e., missing data in the timeseries of market capitalization) to avoid double counting firms with potentially multiple initial entries (i.e., an initial entry, exit and a re-entry). These criteria result in a sample of 3,915 newly Korea. This is consistent with the evidence that countries with more constraint access to public equity financing in general also have lower valuation levels in general (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002) .
Results
The empirical predictions in the previous section posit that the relative maturity of a firm's business model, investment activity and financial position are key factors affecting a firm's survival and valuation. My analysis of nano caps is conducted in three steps. First, I
examine firm fundamentals that separate nano caps from non-nano cap firms. Second, I examine how firm fundamentals are associated with the delisting risk of nano caps. Finally, I examine how the firm fundamentals are associated with firm value among nano caps.
Description of key independent variables
The description of the variables that are related to firm fundamentals based on financial statement data constructed for the empirical analysis are summarized in Exhibit 1 along with the predictions of the signs for the three tests. that receives a value of one if a firm's book value of equity is negative (NegEquity) and zero otherwise. A negative book value of equity is considered an indicator of financial distress (Dichev, 1998) . As a result, a firm's financial flexibility is likely to be severely limited.
However, note that as my sample is constructed of newly listed high-technology firms, which have gone through the exchange listing application process and thus a test of viability, one could also argue that negative book value is due to heavy investments in future assets by a firm with growth opportunities.
What separates nano caps from non-nano caps?
My first empirical test aims to examine firms' accounting fundamentals that explain why a newly listed high-technology firm is "classified" by the equity market as a nano cap. That is, the market evaluates the present value of future cash flows discounted with the risk-adjusted required rate of return as less than USD 50 million. My prediction states that firms with relatively less mature business models, less investment activity in future cash generating assets and less financial resources are more likely to become nano caps at the end of the initial listing year.
I employ the market price data at the end of the initial listing year for two main reasons.
A pragmatic reason is that identification of the initial listing dates, access to financial statement data in tier prospectuses and the availability of market prices on the initial listing date are not available for my large sample of global new lists. A fundamental reason is that even the access to the initial pricing data of the new issues does not necessarily equalize the pricing process of new lists due to, for example, differential allocation and floatation of shares as well as market stabilization (see Welch, 2002, and Eckbo et al., 2007) , including differences in the existence of pre-markets (e.g., Cornelli et al., 2006) . Moreover, even in the U.S., where stock markets are considered to be most informationally efficient, the pricing process is not fully efficient (Lowry and Schwert, 2004) . Consequently, I choose to standardize the data across the sample firms by drawing stock market and financial statement data at the end of the initial listing year. This potentially allows both private and public information to be impounded into the stock price, generating an informationally more efficient estimate of a firm value and, hence, reflecting its future profitability. Belsley et al., 1980) in Tables 2 through 6 . The dependent variable is an indicator variable that receives a value of one if a newly listed firm's market capitalization at the end of its initial listing year is less than USD 50 million and zero otherwise.
In addition to the key fundamental variables, the model controls for a firm's growth opportunities as measured with book-to-price ratio (BP), industry membership and listing year fixed-effects.
I further examine the sensitivity of the results to different country-specific controls employing the instruments developed in law and finance literature. Model 1 has no controls for country-specific factors. In Model 2 I employ controls for the disclosure levels in a country, as classified in Bhattacharya et al. (2003) . Model 3 controls for judicial efficiency, as rated in La Porta et al. (1997) . Model 4 controls for antidirector rights, as classified in La Porta et al. (1997) .
The legal system specific (English Law, French Law, German Law, Scandinavian Law and unclassified countries as a benchmark) controls are employed from La Porta et al. (1997) .
Models 2 to 5 also include a U.S. country dummy, as close to 60% of the 3,915 sample firms are from the U.S. The number of observations available for a particular model also varies by the number of observations available on country-specific control variables.
The results reported in Table 3 show that regardless of the type of the country-specific control, nano caps tend to have significantly (at a conventional five percent level) less assets-inplace, as measured with total assets (Assets), and engage less in investment activities to create tangible (Capex) and intangible assets (RD). Moreover, they have less financial resources, as measured with liquid assets (Cash). In contrast to expectations, the negative operating cash flows (NegCFO) variable is significantly and negatively associated with a newly listed firm's tendency to be a nano cap, while negative profitability measured with accrual-based measure ROA (NegROA) is positively associated with nano cap firm category. One may speculate that this is due to newly listed nano caps' potential tendency to record more non-cash or accrual-based expenses such as write-offs of past investments during their initial listing year having a negative impact on their accrual result (ROA) but leaving the operating cash flows (CFO) intact.
All other proxies for financial strength except cash (that is, Debt, ZeroDebt, NegEquity)
as well as a firm's tendency to pay dividends (DivPaid) and book-to-price ratio (BP), a marketbased proxy for growth opportunities, are not significant. Of the country-specific controls, disclosure level and efficiency of the judicial system are significant and negatively associated with a firm being a nano cap, indicating that nano caps are more likely to emerge in countries with relatively lower disclosure requirements and/or judicial efficiency, after controlling for other factors. This is consistent with the evidence on lower valuation of firms in countries with weaker investor protection (La Porta et al. 2002) . However, the various country-specific controls employed in this study contribute only marginally to the explanatory power of the models, suggesting that firm fundamentals are important cross-sectional drivers of a firm's size class, measured with market capitalization regardless of the firm domain.
In sum, the evidence in Table 3 indicates that nano caps are likely to have less mature business models reflected in assets-in-place, less investment activity to create both tangible and intangible future cash generating assets, and less liquid resources that can be employed to support future investments and, hence, exploit growth opportunities. The evidence on multivariate analysis does not suggest that nano caps are more likely to be financially distressed or exhibit a higher financial risk in general, beyond lower liquid resources, than their non-nano cap counterparts. The evidence provides support to the view that financial statement information provides important information for investors in order to evaluate a newly listed high-technology firms future growth opportunities and as a result in valuing them relative to other industry counterparts globally.
Delisting risk of nano caps
Next I examine whether fundamentals are associated with a nano cap's exit from public trading or delisting risk. My prediction states that firms with relatively less mature business models, less investment activity in future cash generating assets, and less financial resources are more likely to exit public trading..
In my main analysis I employ a logistic regression. The dependent variable receives a value of one if the firm exited public trading under different scenarios and zero otherwise. In
Model 1, the dependent variable is simply an exit from public trading under any condition, including both voluntary (e.g., acquisitions by another company) and involuntary (e.g., violations of listing standards) delistings. I identify the year in which a firm exited public trading by observing the omission of year end market capitalization data in the Worldscope database.
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There are 413 firms, or 26.9% of the nano caps sample firms, that exited public trading. The problem with such a general exit variable is that the exit can be a positive or negative event. The analysis here is more concerned about firm exit under potential financial difficulties.
Consequently, in Models 2 and 3, I employ exit variables that are associated with financial distress.
In Model 2, the dependent variable receives a value of one if the firm exited and its equity is negative at the end of the last available reporting year. There are 188 (12.3%) such firms. A negative book value of equity is considered to indicate a firm in financial distress (Dichev, 1998) . In Model 3, the dependent variable receives a value of one if the firm exited and its price-to-book at the end of the last available reporting year is less than one. The valuation theory asserts that firms with a price-to-book ratio less than one are considered to destroy shareholders' wealth by the market (e.g., Penman, 2007) . There are 290 (18.9%) such exit firms.
The exits are identified within a three-year tracking period; that is, a firm is considered to be delisted if there is no market capitalization data available at the end of the fourth year of being a listed firm. In addition to the variables discussed above, I also include the natural logarithm transformation of the total market capitalization (LnMcap) at the end of a firm's initial listing year and an indicator variable that receives a value of one if the firm's auditor is a Big N auditing firm (BigN) and zero otherwise. The two control variables have been documented to be associated with a firm's delisting risk (e.g., Li et al., 2006) . 13 Also, the additional control variables, as all firm fundamental-related variables, are measured at the end of the initial listing 12 I am not aware of any global database with data on the exits and, in particular, reasons for the exits. I examined the Worldscope and Datastream databases, but these included no statements regarding exits. 13 Other potentially informative variables about a firm's delisting risk include the reputation of a firm's investment banker and involvement of a venture capitalist (e.g., Li et al., 2006) . However, I do not have access to such data on a global basis.
year, except for BigN, which is measured at the moment of data collection in 2004, as the WS database does not provide historical information on the auditor by each reporting year. Again, I
control for the industry and listing year fixed effects as well as U.S. country effects and the effect of legal system, measured by judicial efficiency (La Porta et al., 1997) , as an important control for country-specific factors related to a firm's access to finance and growth opportunities. The results on country and jurisdiction-related controls are not reported in Table 4 in the interest of brevity.
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The results in Table 4 shows that market capitalization (LnMcap) is systematically significantly and negatively associated with firm exit across the three models. In other words, relatively larger nano caps are more likely to survive as listed firms. In contrast, relatively larger firms measured with the natural logarithm transformation of assets (LnAssets) are more likely to exit in general (Model 1) and under a low price-to-book ratio condition. This is in contrast to the idea that relatively more viable firms with mature business models are less likely to exit public trading. There is also evidence in Models 2 and 3 that nano caps that have engaged themselves relatively more in R&D activity (RD) or that have negative equity (NegEquity) and negative operating cash flows (NegCFO) are more likely to exit under financial distress conditions.
Also, assets-in-place (LnAssets) is positively associated with exit under a low price-tobook condition (Model 3). No other variable is statistically significantly associated with a nano cap firm's propensity to exit. Overall, the evidence suggests that nano caps that are relatively larger in terms of market capitalization but not necessarily in terms of assets-in-place. Also, financially stronger nano caps that have engaged relatively less in R&D activity as well as in creating operational and organizational assets (positive operating cash flows) are more likely to survive in public trading during the three-year tracking window employed in this study.
Consequently, the evidence indicates that financial statement information is useful for investors in evaluating a newly listed nano cap's delisting risk.
I also estimated time to exit, or speed of exit, using the Cox proportional hazard model (a survival analysis) as an additional related analysis. The estimation procedure adjusts for the potential bias introduced by truncated data due to the unobservables of a firm's survival period beyond four years in my dataset. The results for the three exit conditions, as discussed above, are reported in Table 5 . While the results are consistent regarding the market capitalization (LnMcap), assets-in-place (LnAssets), R&D activity (RD), negative equity (NegEquity) and liquid resources (Cash) in Table 4 , the negative operating cash flow (NegROA) is not significant anymore. On the other hand, both operating profitability (ROA) and capital expenditures (Capex) become significantly and positively associated with the time to exit under the financial distress conditions in Models 2 and 3. Overall, the results suggest that nano cap firms with lower market capitalization, negative equity, relatively more investments in tangible and intangible assets, but higher profitability are likely to exit relatively sooner from public trading. The results are consistent with the idea that financial statement information provides a useful basis for investors to assess a newly listed nano cap's delisting risk.
Valuation of nano caps
My final analysis focuses on how firm fundamentals explain cross-sectional differences in firm relative valuation among the nano caps. The dependent variable, which measures relative valuation of a firm, is a natural logarithm of Tobin's q, calculated as total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets at the end of a reporting year, following the literature on international valuation (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Doidge et al., 2003) .
In addition to the fundamental variables employed in the previous models, I also include auditor type (BigN) and an average industry valuation multiple of Tobin's q for a control of annual industry-wide valuation effects of all (3,915) newly listed firms, calculated based on global industry membership (e.g., Kim and Ritter, 1999; Bhojraj and Lee, 2002; Bhojraj et al., 2003) . The models control for industry effects, listing year effects, U.S. country fixed-effects and judicial efficiency for each country (coefficients not reported).
I modify my benchmark model (Model 1) to include two naïve indicator variables as a proxy for a firm's delisting risk under negative equity (ExitNegEq) in Model 2 and low valuation (ExitLowPB) in Model 3, as defined in the previous analysis. This implicitly assumes that the market has perfect foresight of a firm's exit within the three year tracking window. I expect that the exit under poor financial conditions is costly to the firm and its investors and, consequently, expect that the sign of the exit indicator variables is negative in Models 2 and 3. (Tables 4 and 5), as they are an important resource for high-technology firms (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2006) .
Finally, the naïve indicator variable for a firm's delisting risk is significant and negatively associated with the firm value only in Model 2 but not in Model 3. This suggests that investors are able to rationally anticipate a firm's propensity to delist under some conditions, and it may provide them price protection, at least under some conditions. The evidence also suggests that investors use information from other sources, beyond the information reflected by the variables included in Model 3 in Table 6 , to evaluate the delisting risk under poor conditions.
Overall the results suggest, consistently with the arguments in Pastor and Veronesi (2003) as well as with Baker and Wurgler (2006) and the evidence on unconventional valuation as discussed in Section 2, that firms with greater uncertainty about their future profitability (e.g., less mature business models, negative profitability due to relatively greater investments in assets that are expensed immediately and weaker financial position) are valued relatively higher among nano caps. Despite of the unconventional valuation of the fundamental signals, the evidence in 
